NOTES ON BERTOLT BRECHT
Brecht's drama
theory involves casting the theater as a place of constructive, dynamic
alienation and social reconstruction.
He develops (along with Vladimir Mayakovski, Vsevelod Meyerhold and
Erwin Piscator) a notion of theater that relies on a form of alienation-effect
or Verfremdungseffekt that entails doing just about anything to keep the
audience critical and aware that it's watching a play: floodlights, stage
mechanics on display, multiple parts for actors, direct address to the
audience, various interruptions, and so forth.
By such means, Brecht orients the theater towards action in the world,
and rejects varieties of ancient and early modern drama theory that
entail drawing us into the spectacle and taking it as if it were real. Doing that, he suggests, only pulls us into
present-day reality and makes us more or less accept it as natural, as "the
way things really are and always will be," whereas we should be trying to
change things for the better.
Let's consider
some of the theories that Brecht rejects, beginning with Aristotle's theory
of tragic drama: His treatise Peri Poietikes tells us that drama is
a species of representation that uses a logical, tightly-constructed plot like
the one in Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus to engender strong identification
with a flawed but noble hero. If all is
done well, says Aristotle, a tragic play will generate the proper tragic
emotions: pity for the hero's plight and a certain dread that if we were in
that hero's place, we might do and suffer the same fate. The upshot of it all seems to be that such
emotions are roused and then quelled, perhaps almost in the manner of physical
exercise that "works out" the body and leaves it in a state of rest,
but ultimately stronger. We may learn
something about ourselves and our place in the world, too -- whether the
knowledge turns out to be comforting or, as is usually the case in tragedy,
quite otherwise. Brecht would see
Aristotelian theory as clever but essentially conservative: it's probably
oriented more towards preserving and justifying the status quo than towards
changing it. Aristotle was a man of
science: his purpose was to study the world, not make radical alterations in
the order of things on the basis of some political theory.
Then
there is the neoclassical emphasis on dramatic illusionism and elegant decorum,
which rely respectively on a reworking of Aristotle's drama theory and Horace's
poetics in his verse treatise Ars Poetica.
Neoclassical theorists insisted -- based on a dubious extrapolation
from comments Aristotle made about the so-called three unities of time, place
and action -- on absolute fidelity to lifelikeness. If the action would logically take three
hours, that's how long the play should run; the location should likewise be
consistent and suitably narrow, and so forth.
And of course French drama in particular was strong on a sense of the
order of things, on what is and is not appropriate to represent: decorum of
speech, manner, and dress must always be observed.
The
neoclassical assumptions are worth drawing out by way of critique, and nobody
does that sort of thing better than "the inestimable Dr. Johnson,"
himself a fine neoclassical critic who could see through the pretensions of
more rigid fellow colleagues across the pond.
Here is a dose of Johnson's commonsense retort against
neoclassical extremism about the unities and dramatic illusion:
…. It is false, that any
representation is mistaken for reality; that any dramatick fable in its
materiality was ever credible, or, for a single moment, was ever credited.
....
The truth is, that the spectators are
always in their senses, and know, from the first act to the last, that the
stage is only a stage, and that the players are only players. They came to hear a certain number of
lines recited with just gesture and elegant modulation. The lines relate to
some action, and an action must be in some place; but the different actions
that complete a story may be in places very remote from each other; and where
is the absurdity of allowing that space to represent first Athens, and
then Sicily, which was always known to be neither Sicily nor Athens,
but a modern theatre?
....
It will be asked, how the drama moves,
if it is not credited. It is credited with all the credit due to a drama. It is
credited, whenever it moves, as a just picture of a real original; as
representing to the auditor what he would himself feel, if he were to do or
suffer what is there feigned to be suffered or to be done. The reflection
that strikes the heart is not, that the evils before us are real evils, but that
they are evils to which we ourselves may be exposed. If there be any
fallacy, it is not that we fancy the players, but that we fancy ourselves
unhappy for a moment; but we rather lament the possibility than suppose the
presence of misery, as a mother weeps over her babe, when she remembers that
death may take it from her. The delight of tragedy proceeds from our
consciousness of fiction; if we thought murders and treasons real, they would
please no more.
Imitations produce pain or pleasure, not because
they are mistaken for realities, but because they bring realities to mind.
The last
thing mentioned, namely that drama and other fictions simply bring realities
to mind, is a good summary of what Johnson has been saying. It is as good as saying that while a fiction on
the stage or page may be "just make-believe," our experience of that
fiction is in itself authentic. When you
imagine something happening to you or someone you care about, your emotional
response will be real enough. People can
be profoundly moved by works of art without any need to forget the boundaries
between make-believe and life in deadly earnest.
But let's
get back to Brecht. His notion of
alienating people when they go to a play may sound unrealistic and counterintuitive,
but a point in Brecht's favor is that we seem to have a compelling urge to
allow ourselves to be drawn into the circle of illusion, or at least --
following Johnson's commonsense view -- we are capable of feeling strongly for characters
and compelling representations that "bring realities to mind." So I suppose Brecht's theory counts on this
fundamental disposition to respond intensely to imaginative fiction and
creatively works with it and against it.
Brecht's plots are in fact quite good, and so is his development and
handling of characters. He isn't saying
that a drama should bore us half to death with stick figures or that it should
be entirely a political and intellectual exercise. Instead, he is trying to awaken the
audience's critical intelligence in a way that goes beyond our just being aware
that "the stage is only a stage, and … the
players are only players." Knowing that doesn't in itself mean the
audience will be inspired to change how they live and treat others. People can enjoy what they are watching, and
indeed it's doubtful that there would be any point in the exercise without the
work being pleasurable -- that's an ancient given only a fool would
discard. At the same time, obvious stage
props and Brechtian ploys like cue cards will often remind them that this is in
fact a spectacle whose action and characters are to be judged, actively
compared to the real world, and at some point in the near future, acted
upon. In Brecht's view, verisimilitude
or "lifelikeness" won't accomplish any of that; in fact, it should be
easy to see that all of this neoclassical thinking we have been talking about
tends to prop up the playwright's present-day reality, not work towards
changing it. The same goes for the
ancient Roman critic Horace's emphasis on decorum -- his famous Ars
Poetica is witty and wise advice for aspiring artists, but at base, it
tells the aspirants that they should learn what their audiences want and what
beliefs they hold, and then reflect those desires and beliefs back to them in a
more elegant form. "Make me
beautiful!" as the saying goes.
That is hardly a prescription for an art that might shake things up
anytime soon.
Other
avenues of thought on drama: Romantic-era plays, even though they rebel against
neoclassical precept and practice, tend to be more psychomache or
spiritual struggle on the part of an alienated hero -- think Byron's Manfred
-- than a kind of drama that urges real social and political change. And as for C19 realist drama like that of,
say, Ibsen or Chekhov, it may have great merit, but once again it's hardly the
vehicle for near-term change that someone with Brecht's revolutionary,
anti-bourgeois sensibilities and agenda would find compatible. For a Marxist, "slow change" is as
good as saying "no change."
Besides, Brecht really isn't interested in designing characters so as to
reveal deep inner conflicts and whatnot -- his theory of the gestus acting
technique is all about demonstrating or evoking what happens at the
interpersonal, social level: "it is what happens between people,"
says Brecht, "that provides them with all the material that they can
discuss, criticize, alter."
("A Short Organum for the Theatre," Kleines Organon für das
Theater. Paragraph 65.)
Finally,
there's always the early twentieth century's experimental theater, just as
Antonin Artaud's articulation of a "theater of cruelty" in his
treatise Theatre and Its Double.
Such theories tend to collapse altogether the critical and experiential
distance between theater and life beyond art, on the premise that, as Artaud
suggests, people have become so numbed, so shellshocked, by so-called real life
that they have forgotten how to have an authentic experience. So art's function would to be to wake people
up with a start. It's an interesting
idea, to be sure, but for Brecht's purposes as a proponent of dialectical or
(earlier) "epic" theater, the theater of cruelty sounds suspiciously
like aesthetic escapism, or even irrationalism.
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